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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a solution to the distributed topology formation problem for large-scale sensor networks with
multi-source multicast flows. The proposed solution is based on game-theoretic approaches in conjunction with network
coding. The proposed algorithm requires significantly low computational complexity, while it is known as NP-hard to find
an optimal topology for network coding deployed multi-source multicast flows. In particular, we formulate the problem of
distributed network topology formation as a network formation game by considering the nodes in the network as players
that can take actions for making outgoing links. The proposed solution decomposes the original game that consists of
multiple players and multicast flows into independent link formation games played by only two players with a unicast
flow. We also show that the proposed algorithm is guaranteed to determine at least one stable topology. Our simulation
results confirm that the computational complexity of the proposed solution is low enough for practical deployment in
large-scale networks.
Keywords: network coding, game theory, topology design, distributed solution, multi-source multicast flows
1. Introduction
Modern mobile devices can be considered as sophisti-
cated computing and networking platforms with enhanced
sensor capabilities. For example, recent mobile medical
devices are equipped with significantly advanced medical
sensors that can precisely record the electrocardiography
(ECG) signals, body temperature, blood glucose levels,
heart rates, blood oxygen saturation, etc. By using these
sensor data, knowledge extraction, inference and predic-
tion become possible. In order for an efficient data anal-
ysis, the data need to be collected in a dedicated storage
(e.g., database). However, it is not always possible to di-
rectly deliver data from sources to destinations. Rather,
the sensor data are often delivered over infrastructureless
wireless networks with an ad hoc manner. With the sup-
port of autonomous networking technologies (e.g., Qual-
comm Wi-Fi SON [1] and Bluetooth mesh networking),
recent mobile devices can instantaneously form large-scale
ad hoc networks by making connections among them and
by transmitting the data obtained from their sensors and
relaying data from other devices. Therefore, it is essential
to design a stable network topology that can simultane-
ously deliver multiple data flows with improved source-
to-destination connectivity and network throughput given
severe power constraints [2, 3].
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One of the challenges in designing a network topology
is high computational complexity involved in finding the
optimal solution in a large-scale network [4, 5, 6]. Be-
cause recent sensor networks contain a large number of
sensor nodes, the number of potential network topologies
increases exponentially with the number of nodes. There-
fore, it is difficult in general to solve the optimization
problem for network topology unless it is formulated as
a special class of optimization problem (e.g., the convex
optimization problem). In order to lower the computa-
tional complexity associated with finding optimal network
topology, distributed approaches are often deployed [7, 8,
9, 10, 11].
Another challenge in the considered large-scale sensor
networks comes from multi-source multicast flows, which
are inevitable in ad hoc networks [12, 13]. Multiple sources
can be included in the network because sensor nodes can
generate data based on their own sensing operations and
deliver information to a set of target destination nodes,
resulting in multicast flows in the network. Examples of
multi-source multicast flows in networks include a sensor
grid [14], a healthcare wireless sensor network [15], and the
Internet of Things [16]. While multi-source multicast flows
frequently overlap in network paths, only one flow can be
delivered at a time. Such bottleneck paths where the flows
are overlapped in a node can incur delay in data delivery,
resulting in network throughput degradation [17, 18, 19].
Therefore, the incoming rate of a node should be taken
into account as a constraint for the network topology de-
sign problem, such that it should not exceed the link ca-
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pacity. As a solution to the problem of network topology
design with the constraint, network coding [20, 21] can
be deployed [7, 8]. Network coding is widely known to
have several advantages, such as efficient resource usage
(e.g., bandwidth and power), and improved robustness and
throughput [22, 23, 24, 25, 26]. In this paper, we employ
inter-session network coding [27] which combines multiple
packets from different sources into a single packet before
transmission [28]. However, it is still challenging to design
a low-complexity strategy for topology formation since it
is an NP-hard problem to find the optimal network topol-
ogy in a network with multi-source multicast flows, where
network coding is blindly deployed [29].
In this paper, we propose a solution to distributed net-
work topology design that overcomes the challenges dis-
cussed above, while explicitly considering the multi-source
multicast flows in large-scale sensor networks. Specifically,
we adopt a game-theoretic approach to formulate a dis-
tributed design problem of network topology as a network
formation game. The nodes in the network are considered
as players in a game, which can decide to make connec-
tions with their neighbor nodes by considering their util-
ity functions. We design the utility function such that it
represents the rewards and costs associated with making
connections. In particular, the reward included in the util-
ity function represents the amount of distance reduction
towards the destination, which can shorten the distance
from sources to destinations, leading to potential network
throughput improvement. Hence, the reward of each node
can be differently assigned by its location in the network.
For example, a high reward is assigned to a node close to
the destination so that the node is encouraged to make
direct links to the destination, which lead to an improved
source-to-destination connectivity. In contrast, a low re-
ward is assigned to a node far from the destination, such
that the node tries to make alternative links by taking ad-
vantage of higher path diversity. We impose the cost asso-
ciated with link formation on the utility function to pre-
vent nodes from making redundant outgoing links. There-
fore, each node can build connections that can maximize
its utility by explicitly considering the tradeoffs between
the rewards and the cost. We claim that the proposed ap-
proach is indeed a distributed solution to network topology
formation because each node determines its own action to
build links. Unlike a centralized optimization solution,
which must evaluate all possible potential network topolo-
gies and thereby incur high computational complexity, the
proposed solution enables each node to choose its own ac-
tions, leading to significantly lower overall complexity.
In order to take into account the constraints on the
incoming rate, which eventually leads to a low-complexity
solution to the topology design, the proposed approach
adopts network coding [20]. Since network coding oper-
ations combine multiple incoming packets into a single
packet, the outgoing rate of a node can always be fixed
so that it can eliminate the constraints on the incoming
rate for a node. This enables a node to build its outgo-
ing links without considering the link formations of other
nodes, which means that decisions about link formation
can be made between only two nodes. Therefore, an n-
player network formation game that includes multicast
flows can be decomposed into independent 2-player link
formation games with a unicast flow, as we analytically
show in this paper. Because the complexity required to
solve a 2-player link formation game with a unicast flow
is significantly lower than that needed for an n-player net-
work formation game with multi-source multicast flow, the
overall complexity can be significantly reduced. Note that
if network coding is not deployed, the n-player network
formation game cannot be decomposed into 2-player link
formation games.
The main contributions of this paper can be summa-
rized as follows.
• We formulate the problem of network topology de-
sign as a network formation game, which leads to a
distributed strategy for topology formation.
• We analytically show that network coding decom-
poses the network formation game into link forma-
tion games, leading to an algorithm with significantly
low complexity.
• We design a utility function for the network forma-
tion game such that nodes can explicitly consider the
tradeoff between the distance reduction and the cost
associated with making links.
• We quantitatively evaluate the proposed solution and
show that the proposed solution eventually leads to
increased network throughput and a reduced number
of unnecessary redundant links between nodes.
Note that the focus of this paper is not on the code
design for inter-session network coding, which has been
extensively studied in prior works [30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35].
Rather, we focus on how to design network topologies that
can lead to improved network performance (e.g., through-
put and delay), which have been mostly considered as a
given condition in previous literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we briefly review the related works. The network
model and detailed process of data collection and dissem-
ination based on network coding operations are discussed
in Section 3. The network formation game for multicast
flows and its decomposition into link formation games for
a unicast flow are proposed in Section 4. Simulation re-
sults and numerical evaluations are presented in Section 5,
and conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2. Related Works
Before the notion of network coding, it was infeasible to
achieve an upper bound of multicast capacity by conven-
tional store-and-forward (SF) relaying architectures [36].
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The Steiner tree based topology design can achieve the
upper bound of multicast capacity, but solving the Steiner
tree is an NP-hard problem [37]. In [20], it is first shown
that network coding can achieve the maximum through-
put via the max-flow min-cut theorem, and it is further
proved that linear network coding [38] can achieve the up-
per bound of capacity. The optimal topology solution for a
single source scenario is studied in [39]; however, in multi-
source scenarios, which are frequently observed in sensor
network scenarios, the max-flow min-cut bounds cannot
fully characterize the capacity region, and thus, only loose
outer bounds [40] and sub-optimal solutions [41] are stud-
ied.
Network coding has been deployed in a variety of sensor
network scenarios [22, 23, 42]. For example, network cod-
ing can improve the energy efficiency of a body area sensor
network [42]. A robust network coding protocol is pro-
posed for smart grids to enhance the reliability and speed
of data gathering [22]. In [23], a mobile crowd-sensing sce-
nario is considered for decentralized data collection, and
network coding is deployed for energy and spectrum effi-
ciency.
Topology design in sensor networks has been studied in
the context of self-organizing networks [9, 43, 44]: in [43],
protocols are proposed for the self-organization of wireless
sensor networks with a large number of mainly static and
highly energy constrained nodes; in [9], a self-organizing
routing protocol for mobile sensor nodes declares the mem-
bership of a cluster as they move and confirms whether a
mobile sensor node can communicate with a specific cluster
head within a time slot allocated in a time division multi-
ple access schedule; in [44], distributed energy efficient de-
ployment algorithms are proposed for mobile sensors and
intelligent devices that form an ambient intelligent net-
work.
Distributed decision making has been widely consid-
ered in the field of game theory and there have been a large
number of studies on network formation games not only in
economics but also in engineering [45]. For application to
wireless sensor networks, game-theoretic distributed topol-
ogy control for wireless transmission power is proposed in
sensor networks [10]. The purpose of topology control is
to assign per-node optimal transmission power such that
the resulting topology can guarantee target network con-
nectivity. A similar study of a topology control game in
[46] aimed to choose the optimal power level for network
nodes in ad hoc networks to ensure the desired connectiv-
ity properties. In [11], a dynamic topology control scheme
that prolongs the lifetime of a wireless sensor network is
provided based on a non-cooperative game.
In Table 1, several representative related works are
classified in terms of source, flow, solution and relaying
types. In contrast to [9, 10, 39, 41, 43, 44, 46], this paper
includes the most generalized source and flow types, i.e.,
multi-source multicast flows. Compared to [11], which also
considers multi-source multicast flows, this paper explic-
itly considers the network coding function in the topol-
ogy design problem such that the previously described
throughput advantage of network coding in a multicast
flow can be properly utilized.
3. Network Coding Based Sensor Networks
In this section, we describe our network model and
network coding based packet dissemination in sensor net-
works. The goal of the network is to deliver all data col-
lected by source nodes to their own destination nodes. In
Table 2, a summary of frequently used notation is pre-
sented.
3.1. Network Model and Inter-link Dependency Condition
We consider a directed graph G with a set of nodes
VpGq and a set of directed links EpGq2. An element vi P
VpGq can be a source node and/or a destination node (i.e.,
data sink)3, and xi denotes source data collected by node
vi. The number of nodes in VpGq is denoted by |VpGq| “
NV , where | ¨ | denotes the cardinality of a set. Every
node in VpGq plays the role of source by collecting data
(i.e., sensing) and simultaneously plays the role of relay by
disseminating the collected data. The set of destination
nodes for vi is denoted by Di Ď VpGq, and D “ ti|vi P
tD1, . . . ,DNV uu represents an index set of destinations for
all network nodes. The set of destinations is constant and
not changed over time.
A directed link from vi to vj is denoted by eij P t0, 1u,
where the active link (eij “ 1) can deliver data and Xij
denotes the data transmitted via eij . Otherwise, the link is
inactive, and eij “ 0. The link eij has a direction, i.e., vi is
the tail and vj is the head, so that eij ‰ eji. In this paper,
eij is called an incoming link of vj or an outgoing link of vi.
Note that both eij and eji can be simultaneously active,
i.e., eij “ 1 and eji “ 1 [47, 48, 49]4. EpGq includes only
active links so that |EpGq| is the number of active links in
G.
Let δij be the Euclidean distance between vi and vj
5.
As special cases, we define δij “ 0 if vi “ vj and δij “ 8 if
vi and vj are not able to make a link between them. The
set of neighbor nodes of vi is denoted by Hi “ tvj |0 ă
2 If the considered network changes over time, the network can
be modeled by a directed graph Gt with a set of nodes VpGtq and
a set of directed links EpGtq as a function of time slot t. However,
our focus in this paper is on the distributed solution for topology
formation at each time slot , so we can omit the subscript t in the
rest of this paper without the loss of generality.
3 A destination node can be a source node by itself, but, it is not
allowed that a destination node can be a source node for other nodes.
For example, a destination node that is connected to a server can be
a source node by itself (i.e., the server can have data obtained from
the destination node).
4There has been extensive research on the full-duplex mode in
network coding based relay communication allowing two-way com-
munications [47, 48, 49].
5In order to estimate distance between nodes, several works such
as [50, 51] can be adopted in our solution.
3
Table 1: Related studies in network topology design
[9, 43] [10, 44, 46] [41] [39] [11] This Paper
Source type Multi-source Multi-source Multi-source Single source Multi-source Multi-source
Simultaneous
Multiple Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Source Support
Flow type Unicast Unicast Unicast Multicast Multicast Multicast
Multiple Point
Destination No No No Yes Yes Yes
Support
Solution type Centralized Distributed Centralized Distributed Distributed Distributed
Network
Formation High Low High Low Low Low
Complexity
Relaying type SF SF Network coding Network coding SF Network coding
Table 2: Summary of notations
Notation Description Notation Description
G a direct graph VpGq a set of node in G
EpGq a set of directed links in G Ln a subgraph
vi a node with index i xi source data collected by vi
eij a directed link from vi to vj δij Euclidean distance between vi and vj
Xij data transmitted via eij JG network status of G
Φ network coding operation GGpDq network formation game of G with destination set D
ui utility function of player vi Ri reward of player vi
λi cost of player vi ai action of player vi
Λ unit cost for link formation U network utility
δij ď ∆u, where ∆ denotes a connection boundary6. If
δij ą ∆, then a link between vi and vj cannot be formed,
i.e., eij “ eji “ 0. H˜ini “ tvj |eji “ 1,@vj P Hiu and
H˜outi “ tvj |eij “ 1,@vj P Hiu denote a set of neighbor
nodes of vi with active incoming and outgoing links, re-
spectively. An illustrative example of a sensor network
topology with seven nodes is shown in Figure 1.
For simplicity, we assume that the capacity of link eij is
one packet per unit of time slot, i.e., a node can transmit
only one packet in each time slot [52, 53, 54]7. We also
assume that each sensor always has a packet to send at
each time slot (e.g., a sensor generates a packet for every
time slot). Hence, if it builds an outgoing link, a packet to
be transmitted always exists through the outgoing link. If
a node has multiple outgoing links, it multicasts a single
packet per time slot through all the outgoing links so that
all outgoing links from one node deliver the same packet at
the same time slot. If a node has multiple incoming links,
it can receive multiple individual packets by deploying, for
example, multipacket reception techniques [55, 56]. Even
though a node can receive multiple packets at a single
6This connection boundary in terms of the Euclidean distance
is motivated by realistic communication problems such as limited
power budget of a node and interference among wireless nodes.
7Note that this assumption can be easily generalized to Ω bits per
unit slot for a constant Ω.
time slot, under the conventional SF relaying architecture,
a node cannot transmit more than one packet at a time
because of the link capacity constraints. Hence, a node
becomes a bottleneck of flows when it receives a larger
number of packets than its output link capacity (i.e., one
packet per unit of time slot), which is referred to as the
bottleneck problem.
To prevent the bottleneck problem, a node may restrict
the number of incoming packets to not exceed the link
capacity, and such a constraint can be feasible to restrict
the number of incoming links to at most one, i.e.,ÿ
@viPH˜inj
eij ď 1 for all vj P VpGq (1)
which is referred to as the inter-link dependency condition
in this paper.
3.2. Elimination of Inter-link Dependency by Network Cod-
ing
The network status of G is defined as the set of data
included in EpGq with the inter-link dependency condition
in (1), which is denoted by JG and expressed as (2). If
eij P EpGq, then Xij ¨ eij “ Xij . Otherwise, Xij ¨ eij “ 0.
Hence, tXij ¨ eij |@vi, vj P VpGq, i ‰ ju in (2) represents a
set of data included in EpGq for the link dependent data
Xij .
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v1
v2
v3
v4
v5
Sensor
Active Link
Inactive Link
v7
v6
Figure 1: An illustrative example of sensor network topology G,
where VpGq “ tv1, . . . , v7u and EpGq “ te12, e24, e46, e45, e57, e31u.
For node v4, a set of neighbor nodes with active incoming and out-
going links are H˜in4 “ tv2u and H˜out4 “ tv5, v6u, respectively. All
nodes in this example have at most one incoming link.
If network coding is deployed in G, the resulting net-
work status is denoted by ΦpJGq and is expressed as
ΦpJGq “ 〈tpj ¨ eij |@vi, vj P VpGq, i ‰ ju〉 (3)
where pj denotes a network coded packet that flows into
vj . The network coded packet pj “ rC1j , . . . , CNV j , yjs is
a vector of the global coding coefficients rC1j , . . . , CNV jsT
as the header and yj as the payload, which is constructed
as
yj “
NVÿ
k“1
à pCkj b xkq (4)
where ‘ and b denote the addition and multiplication
operations in a Galois field (GF), respectively. Hence, the
network coding function Φ combines all packets that flow
into vj and generates a single packet pj . This operation
allows a node to take multiple incoming links and prevents
the bottleneck problem, so that the inter-link dependency
in (2) can be eliminated as in (3).
The elimination of the inter-link dependency through
the network coding function Φ can be interpreted as fol-
lows. The network coding function Φ converts the link
dependent data Xij into the link independent data pj .
Hence, vj receives a single of packet pj from all incom-
ing links no matter how many incoming links are formed8.
Examples of this interpretation are illustrated in Figure 2,
and more details of network coding operations are provided
in Appendix A.
8Note that (3) does not mean that the packet pj is coming to the
node vj for all incoming links eij . Actual packets in eij are not all
the same as pj . All incoming packets are combined into pj based on
the network coding operation in (4) and it can be interpreted as the
node receives pj from previous nodes.
4. Distributed Topology Formation Based on Game-
theoretic Approaches
In this section, we propose a distributed topology for-
mation strategy in a sensor network with multi-source mul-
ticast flows. We formulate the problem of how to make de-
cisions on link connections between nodes in the considered
network as a game, referred to as the network formation
game. Then, we show that the network formation game
can be decomposed into link formation games, which en-
ables each node to decide which links are active or inactive.
Therefore, this eventually leads to a distributed solution.
4.1. Network Formation Game
Given a set of nodes VpGq and a destination index ma-
trix D “ rDT1 , . . . ,DTNV s, where Di “ rj|j P Dis is an
index vector for destination nodes of vi, a strategic form
of the network formation game can be expressed as
GGpDq “ xVpGq, paiqviPVpGq, puipai, a´i,DiqqviPVpGqy,
where VpGq, ai “Ś@vjPHieij “Ś@vjPHit0, 1u, and uipai, a´i,Diq
denote a finite set of players, a finite set of actions for
player vi, and the utility function of player vi, respectively.Ś
denotes the Cartesian product.
A network node vi P VpGq is a player in the network
formation game, which makes decisions about link forma-
tion with its neighbor nodes @vj P Hi. The action of vi
is denoted by ai “ peijq@vjPHi P ai. The utility of vi is
defined as a quasi-linear utility function, expressed as
uipai, a´i,Diq “ Ripai,Diq ´ λipai, a´iq (5)
where a´i denotes a set of actions taken by players other
than vi in V. Given destination nodes, the utility of a
player can be determined by the reward Ripai,Diq and
cost λipai, a´iq associated with its own and others’ ac-
tions pai, a´iq. More details regarding reward and cost are
provided below.
Reward Ripai,Diq: The reward represents the dis-
tance reduction toward the destination nodes Di by taking
the action ai at vi, defined as
Ripai,Diq “
ÿ
vjPHi
Eijpaiq pf pδjDiq ´ f pδiDiqq (6)
where Eijpaiq indicates whether the link eij is active or
not for an action ai, i.e.,
Eijpaiq “ eij P t0, 1u.
For example, if the action ai makes the link eij active,
Eijpaiq “ 1. Otherwise, Eijpaiq “ 0. In (6), δiDi “
pδijq@jPDi denotes a vector of distances from vi to desti-
nations vj for all j P Di, and f : R|Di|ˆ1 Ñ R denotes
an inversely proportional function such that fpδiDiq is in-
versely proportional to δiDi
9.
9 More details about fpδiDi q are discussed in Section 5 with an
example (e.g., (28)-(29)).
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JG “
〈
tXij ¨ eij |@vi, vj P VpGq, i ‰ ju,
¨˝ ÿ
@viPH˜inj
eij ď 1,@vj P VpGq‚˛〉 . (2)
v2
v3
v5
v4
Link dependent data:   
Inter-link  
dependency condition:X34 · e34
X24 · e24
X54 · e54
X64 · e64
X74 · e74Xi4
v6
v7 v2
v3
v5
v4
p4 · e24
p4 · e34
p4 · e54
p4 · e64
p4 · e74
No inter-link  
dependency condition
Link independent data: 
p4
v6
v7
X
8vi2H˜in4
ei4  1
JG4 =
*
{Xi4 · ei4|8vi 2 V(G4), i 6= 4},
0@ X
8vi2H˜in4
ei4  1
1A+ .  (JG4) = h{p4 · ei4|8vi 2 V(G4), i 6= 4}i
Figure 2: Illustrative examples of the network status of G4 without (left) and with (right) network coding function Φ. Note that G4 has v4 and
its neighbor nodes, which are presented in Figure 1, i.e., G4 Ă G and VpG4q “ tv2, v3, v4, v5, v6, v7u. (left) Without network coding function Φ
in v4, the inter-link dependency condition must be satisfied and the data are link-dependent. (right) With network coding function Φ in v4,
multiple links can be established simultaneously (i.e., no inter-link dependency condition is considered), and Φ allows data to be interpreted
as link-independent.
The reward function is designed such that a higher re-
ward is given to the node if it builds links closer toward
the destination. Hence, if vj is located closer to destina-
tion Di than vi, i.e., δjDi ă δiDi , then fpδjDiq ą fpδiDiq,
as f is an inversely proportional function. This leads
to f pδjDiq ´ f pδiDiq ą 0, which improves rewards on
Ripai,Diq in (6), if Eijpaiq “ 1. Therefore, vi takes the
action ai that builds the link to vj (i.e., eij “ 1) in order
to maximize its own reward.
The reward function furthermore takes the importance
of node locations into account by assigning higher rewards
to closer nodes than the nodes far from the destination10.
Consider two node pairs pvi, vjq and pv1i, v1jq, for example,
where both vi and v
1
i have the same destination D for
simplicity. Suppose two node pairs have the same distance
between them, i.e.,
δiD ´ δjD “ δi1D ´ δj1D (7)
but the pair pvi, vjq is located closer to the destination
than pv1i, v1jq, i.e.,
δiD ă δi1D, δjD ă δj1D. (8)
Then,
fpδjDq ´ f pδiDq ą fpδj1Dq ´ f pδi1Dq . (9)
because of the inversely proportional function f . There-
fore, it is confirmed that the definition of the reward func-
tion in (6) assigns higher rewards to the node closer to the
destination (i.e., vi), even though the distance reduction
by making a link is the same. Such reward design im-
proves the source-to-destination connectivity, because the
10In Figure 4, it is confirmed that the proposed reward function
encourages a node close to the destination to build a link by giving
higher rewards than a node far from the destination.
link formation at a node closer to the destination has crit-
ical impact on network connectivity (i.e., successful con-
nection from sources to destinations).
Cost λipai, a´iq: Given the actions pai, a´iq selected
by players, the cost is defined as
λipai, a´iq “
ÿ
vjPHi
ˆ
Eijpaiq
Eijpaiq ` Ejipajq ˆ Λ
˙
(10)
where Λ is a unit cost for link formation. We define 0{0 “ 0
[57, 58, 59, 60]. The cost λipai, a´iq in (10) represents the
total payment required for all outgoing links that vi makes.
This can be considered as the penalty incurred by the mes-
sage exchanges and time consumption for negotiation (i.e.,
required process for link formation between nodes [61]), or
the penalty for causing interference to neighbor nodes11.
For a link between vi and vj , if either vi or vj decides to
build the outgoing link, the unit cost for link formation Λ
is solely charged to the node that builds the link. If both
nodes decide to build the link, the link formation cost is
charged to them equally12.
The solution to the network formation game GGpDq is
the set of actions pai˚ , a˚´ iq, which is optimally taken by
each player, determining EpGq and the corresponding net-
work topology. While the proposed solution to the network
11These are essential for constructing a link between nodes in the
considered network setting as nodes share their services and resources
without any central administration or coordination [62]. If the link
is bidirectional, i.e., both nodes would like to make a connection be-
tween them, they can share the cost associated with control message
exchanges and the required time consumption for negotiation [63],
leading to cost reduction. However, if the link is unidirectional, i.e.,
only one of the nodes would like to solely make a connection to other
node, the node is responsible for the cost associated with the message
exchanges and negotiation time.
12 The equal-division mechanism was first proposed in [64] and
it has been extensively deployed in the network formation cost
(e.g., [65, 66]).
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formation game GGpDq can be obtained in a distributed
way, the computational complexity required to find the
solution can be significantly increased, especially as G be-
comes large (i.e., the network size grows). Hence, we show
that the network formation game can be decomposed into
several link formation games by deploying network coding,
which enables the solution to be found with significantly
lower complexity in the next.
4.2. Network Coding Based Game Decomposition
We define edge-disjoint subgraphs of G as a set of sub-
graphs whose links are disjointed and the union of them is
G13. Specifically, forN edge-disjoint subgraphs L1, . . . ,LN
of G are
• VpLnq Ď VpGq,
• EpLnq Ď EpGq,
• ŤNn“1 EpLnq “ EpGq and
• EpLnq X EpLmq “ H for 1 ď n,m ď N,n ‰ m.
which means that if a graph is decomposed into multi-
ple edge-disjoint subgraphs, the vertices are allowed to be
shared across subgraphs, but edges are not [67]14. The
network formation game for a subgraph Ln with D can be
expressed as
GLnpDq “ xVpLnq, paiqviPVpLnq, puipai, a´i,DiqqviPVpLnqy
and the network status for the resulting network from
GLnpDq is denoted by JGLn pDq, as defined in (2).
Since the actions simultaneously determined by the
players in a game are the union of the links that are ac-
tive and inactive in the network, the product operation
for games can be considered as the union of their network
status, expressed as
Nź
n“1
GLnpDq fi
Nď
n“1
JGLn pDq. (11)
In Theorem 1, we show that network coding can decom-
pose the network formation game GGpDq into independent
games GLnpDq for subgraph Ln for 1 ď n ď N .
Theorem 1. The network formation game for a graph can
be decomposed by network coding into independent games
for edge-disjoint subgraphs.
13 There can be maximum
`NV
2
˘
edge-disjoint subgraphs in G as
each link with two nodes becomes a subgraph of G. Hence, it is
always possible to decompose G into edge-disjoint subgraphs.
14By the definition of edge-disjoint subgraph, a vertex can be
shared in multiple subgraphs such that data can be conveyed from
one subgraph to another subgraph via the shared vertex. This allows
data packets in the source nodes to be delivered to the destination
nodes.
Proof. To show that the network formation game for a
graph can be decomposed by network coding into inde-
pendent games for edge-disjoint subgraphs, it should be
proved that
ΦpGGpDqq “
Nź
n“1
ΦpGLnpDqq (12)
where Φ is the network coding function defined in (3).
The network formation game for a graph G is the joint
game of edge-disjoint subgraphs L1, . . . ,LN , which can be
played as sequential conditional games based on a chain
rule as in (13)–(15). Here, the equality between (13) and
(14) is based on (11), and (15) is based on the definition
of the network status in (2). Note that the network for-
mation game expressed in (15) still includes the inter-link
dependency.
By applying the network coding function Φ in (15), we
have
ΦpGGpDqq (16)
“ 〈tpj ¨ eij |@vi, vj P VpL1q, i ‰ ju〉
Y 〈tpj ¨ eij |@vi, vj P VpL2q, i ‰ ju〉
Y ¨ ¨ ¨ Y 〈tpj ¨ eij |@vi, vj P VpLN q, i ‰ ju〉 (17)
“ ΦpJL1pDqq Y ΦpJL2pDqq Y ¨ ¨ ¨ Y ΦpJLN pDqq (18)
“ ΦpGL1pDqq ¨ ΦpGL2pDqq ¨ ¨ ¨ΦpGLN pDqq (19)
“
Nź
n“1
ΦpGLnpDqq
where the equality between (17) and (18) is based on (3),
and (19) is based on (11). Therefore, the network forma-
tion game for a graph can be decomposed by network cod-
ing into independent games for edge-disjoint subgraphs,
which completes the proof.
Importantly, Theorem 1 implies that GGpDq with mul-
tiple destinations in D can be further decomposed into
GLnpdq for 1 ď n ď N and d P D with a single destination
node vd, which is shown in Theorem 2.
In order to prove this, we define a virtual subnode of
vi that has flows to be delivered to destination vd as vipdq.
By definition, there are |D| virtual subnodes in vi. Simi-
larly, a virtual sublink of eij with destination vd is denoted
by eijpdq, and eij includes |D| sublinks. Then, a virtual
subgraph for destination vd can be defined as Lnpdq, which
satisfies
• VpLnpdqq Ď VpLnpDqq,
• EpLnpdqq Ď EpLnpDqq,
• ŤdPD EpLnpdqq “ EpLnpDqq, and
• EpLnpdqq X EpLnpd1qq “ H for d, d1 P D, d ‰ d1.
Theorem 2. The network formation game with multicast
flows can be decomposed by network coding into indepen-
dent games with unicast flows for edge-disjoint subgraphs.
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GGpDq “ GL1,L2,¨¨¨ ,LN pDq
“ GL1pDq ¨GL2|L1pDq ¨ ¨ ¨GLN |L1,L2,¨¨¨ ,LN´1pDq (13)
“ JGL1 pDq Y JGL2|L1 pDq Y ¨ ¨ ¨ Y JGLN |L1,L2,¨¨¨ ,LN´1 pDq (14)
“
〈
tXij ¨ eij |@vi, vj P VpL1q, i ‰ ju,
¨˝ ÿ
@viPH˜inj
eij ď 1,@vj P VpL1q‚˛〉
ď〈
tXij ¨ eij |@vi, vj P VpL2q, i ‰ ju,
¨˝ ÿ
@viPH˜inj
eij ď 1,@vj P VpL1q Y VpL2q‚˛〉
ď
¨ ¨ ¨
ď〈
tXij ¨ eij |@vi, vj P VpLN q, i ‰ ju,
¨˝ ÿ
@viPH˜inj
eij ď 1,@vj P
Nď
n“1
VpLnq‚˛〉 (15)
Proof. In this proof, we show that ΦpGGpDqq can be de-
composed into ΦpGLnpdqq for 1 ď n ď N and d P D.
In Theorem 1, it is shown that
ΦpGGpDqq “
Nź
n“1
Φ pGLnpDqq . (20)
Since a subgraph LnpDq can be decomposed into virtual
subgraphs Lnpdq,@d P D, the game GLnpDq with network
coding can also be decomposed into independent games
GLnpdq,@d P D for virtual subgraphs based on Theorem 1,
i.e.,
Φ pGLnpDqq “
ź
dPD
Φ pGLnpdqq . (21)
Therefore, we can conclude from (20) and (21) that
ΦpGGpDqq “
Nź
n“1
ź
dPD
Φ pGLnpdqq , (22)
which completes the proof.
Theorem 2 implies that network coding allows the net-
work formation game for multicast flows (i.e., GLnpDq)
to be decomposed into independent games with unicast
flows for edge-disjoint subgraphs (i.e., GLnpdq,@d P D).
Moreover, Theorem 2 enables the topology of a network
with multi-source multicast flows to be determined in a
distributed way, by solving independent games of edge-
disjoint subgraphs with unicast flows, referred to as the
link formation game in this paper. More details about
the link formation game are given in the next section. An
illustrative example of the network formation and link for-
mation games are shown in Figure 3.
4.3. Link Formation Games and Distributed Topology De-
sign
As discussed in Section 4.2, a link formation game con-
sists of two players with a unicast flow. The strategic form
of the link formation game can be expressed as
GLpdq “ xVpLq, paiqviPVpLq, puipai, a´i, dqqviPVpLqy (23)
Link formation game
v2
v1
v3
v5v6
v7
GG(D)
Network formation game
GLn(D)
Network formation game  
      for a subgraph                  
v4
v4(7)
v5(7)v5(6)
v4(6)
e45(6)
e54(6)
e54(7)
e45(7)
GLn(7)
Ln
Figure 3: The decomposition of the network formation game into link
formation games for the network illustrated in Figure 1. The network
formation game GGpDq is decomposed into independent games of
edge-disjoint subgraphsGLn pDq, which are further decomposed into
link formation games, GLn pdq. Note that the decomposition can be
permitted only by deploying network coding.
where VpLq “ tvi, vju and ai “ t0, 1u denote a player set
and an action set for player vi for destination vd, respec-
tively. The utility function is expressed as
uipai, aj , dq “ Ripai, dq ´ λipai, ajq (24)
“ ai pfpδjdq ´ f pδidqq ´ Λ ¨ ai
ai ` aj (25)
where fpδidq : RÑ R is an inversely proportional function
of δid. For the link formation game, the cost function can
be expressed as
λipai, ajq “ Λ ¨ ai
ai ` aj “
$’&’%
Λ, if ai “ 1, aj “ 0
Λ{2, if ai “ 1, aj “ 1
0, if ai “ 0
.
The corresponding normal form of the link formation game
is shown in Table 3.
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Table 3: The normal form of the link formation game
(ui, uj , d) aj “ 1 aj “ 0
ai “ 1 pRip1, dq ´ Λ2 , Rjp1, dq ´ Λ2 q pRip1, dq ´ Λ, 0q
ai “ 0 p0, Rjp1, dq ´ Λq p0, 0q
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for Distributed Topology Design
Based on Link Formation Games
Require: a set of nodes VpGq, sets of neighbor nodes Hi
for vi P VpGq, an index set of destinations D, utility
function uipai, aj , dq for vi P VpGq
1: Initialize: EpGq “ H
2: Decompose VpGq into a set of node pairs VpLnq for
1 ď n ď `NV2 ˘
3: for n = 1:
`
NV
2
˘
do
4: pvi, vjq Ð VpLnq //assign players
5: for d P D do
6: Initialize: pai˚ , aj˚ q Ð p0, 0q, flag “ 0
7: // begin link formation game
8: while flag “ 0 do
9: temp aÐ pai˚ , aj˚ q
10: ai˚ Ð arg maxai uipai, aj˚ , dq
11: aj˚ Ð arg maxaj ujpai˚ , aj , dq
12: if temp a “ pai˚ , aj˚ q then
13: flag Ð 1
14: eij Ð ai˚ , eji Ð aj˚
15: return EpGq
As a solution concept for the link formation game, we
adopt the pure strategy Nash equilibrium (NE). A pure
strategy NE pai˚ , aj˚ q for vi and vj can be expressed as
uipai˚ , aj˚ , dq ě uipai, aj˚ , dq for all ai P ai (26)
and
ujpai˚ , aj˚ , dq ě ujpai˚ , aj , dq for all aj P aj . (27)
If multiple pure strategy NEs exist, the set of pure strategy
NEs is denoted by
A˚ “ tpai˚ , aj˚ q|uipai˚ , aj˚ , dq ě uipai, aj˚ , dq,@ai P ai,
ujpai˚ , aj˚ , dq ě ujpai˚ , aj , dq,@aj P aju.
The pure strategy NE enables nodes vi and vj to decide
which outgoing links are active or inactive, resulting in a
stable network topology EpLq.
The steps for the proposed solution are described in
Algorithm 1. In Algorithm 1, nodes VpGq are decom-
posed into N “ `NV2 ˘ sets of node pairs VpLnq for 1 ď
n ď N . Then, the link formation game is formulated
as GLnpdq “ xVpLnq, paiqviPVpLnq, puipai, a´i, dqqviPVpLnqy
given VpLnq and a destination node vd. The link forma-
tion games, GLnpdq for 1 ď n ď N , @d P D, are solved
by finding a pure strategy NE, and all the active links can
eventually be included in EpGq.
Note that Algorithm 1 is guaranteed to determine at
least one stable topology, as shown in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. It is guaranteed that at least one topology
can be determined by Algorithm 1.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Based on Theorem 3, we confirm that Algorithm 1 can
always provide at least one network topology for the multi-
source multicast network. In the next section, we provide
performance evaluation based on simulation results.
5. Simulation Results
In this simulation, we consider a sensor network in
which all sensors collect data, and some of them are desti-
nation nodes. Sensor nodes aim to deliver their collected
data to their destination nodes in Di by making links be-
tween them.
5.1. Simulation Setup
We consider NV nodes in a cell with a radius of R,
where the nodes are randomly located over the cell based
on a uniform distribution. Since a node vi would like to de-
liver its collected data to its destination nodes in Di, there
are
řNV
i“1 |Di| total flows in the network. The connection
boundary is set as ∆ “ R so that the neighbor nodes of vi
are determined as Hi “ tvj |0 ă δij ď Ru. Note that the
longest distance between two edge nodes of the cell can be
2R such that our simulation setting ∆ “ R may induce
a multi-hop network. Each node makes its own decisions
for outgoing link formation with neighbor nodes based on
Algorithm 1.
In the simulations, we use a function fpδidq for the
utility function in (25), defined as
fpδidq “ 1
δ2id ` 1
(28)
which satisfies the requirements for fpδidq discussed in
Section 4.1, i.e., it is inversely proportional to δid and
fpδjdq ´ fpδidq ą 0 for δid ą δjd. Hence, if vi makes an
outgoing link to vj , which is closer to a destination node
than vi, then positive rewards are given to vi. For example,
consider two node pairs pvi, vjq and pv1i, v1jq that have 1)
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Figure 4: The number of outgoing links per node for NV “ 50.
the same distance between them, i.e., δid´δjd “ δi1d´δj1d,
but 2) different locations, i.e., δid ă δi1d, δjd ă δj1d. Then,
fpδjdq ´ f pδidq ą fpδj1dq ´ f pδi1dq , (29)
which implies that the nodes close to the destination pvi, vjq
receive more reward than the distant nodes pv1i, v1jq. The
utility function of the link formation game in (25) can be
correspondingly expressed as
uipai, aj , dq “ ai
˜
1
δ2jd ` 1
´ 1
δ2id ` 1
¸
´
ˆ
ai
ai ` aj ¨ Λ
˙
.
(30)
We finally define network utility as a measure of the
resulting networks performance, expressed as
Upai, a´i,Dq “
ÿ
@viPVpGq
˜ÿ
dPD
Ripai, dq ´ λipai, a´iq
¸
which includes both the total rewards from all the desti-
nation nodes and the costs required to make links in the
networks. Therefore, the network utility can be used to
quantify how many rewards can be earned by the nodes
while reducing the costs of link formation.
5.2. Numerical Analysis of the Proposed Topology Design
In this section, we numerically analyze several aspects
of the proposed algorithm for the topology formation im-
plemented by Algorithm 1. In the simulations, we consider
two destination nodes, i.e., |Di| “ 2 for 1 ď i ď NV , which
are randomly determined in each experiment unless oth-
erwise stated. The connection boundary is set as R “ 10
and all the experiment results are averaged from 1, 000
independent experiments.
Figure 4 shows the effects of node locations on the
probability of link formation. In the experiment, we con-
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Figure 5: The number of active links for unit costs in various network
sizes.
sider two adjacent nodes as the destination for all nodes,
located at the cell edge, i.e., D1 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ DNV . The nodes
in the network are classified as three types based on their
distance from the destination nodes: those that are close to
the destinations (NEAR), far from the destinations (FAR),
and in the middle of them (MID). Figure 4 clearly confirms
that the nodes closer to the destinations make more out-
going links. This is because fpδidq in the utility function
enables nodes closer to the destinations to obtain more
rewards by making outgoing links.
Figure 5 shows the total number of active links in a
network (|EpVq|) for various unit costs (Λ) and network
sizes (NV ). It can be confirmed that a smaller number of
active links is included in a resulting network topology as
the network size decreases or the unit cost increases. This
is because the nodes with more neighbor nodes or with
lower unit cost can make a larger number of active links.
The number of active links in a network topology can
influence the successful connection from source nodes to
destination nodes. In order to evaluate the impact of the
number of active links on successful network formation, we
define the connection failure ratio as the number of discon-
nected flows over the total number of flows (
řNV
i“1 |Di|). In
Figure 6, connection failure ratios for unit costs are pre-
sented.
As shown in Figure 5, the number of active links de-
creases rapidly as Λ increases in the range of small Λ values
(e.g., 0 ď Λ ď 0.2). However, this does not significantly
affect the connection failure ratios as shown in Figure 6. In
contrast, a small number of links can be active in the range
of large Λ values (e.g., 0.8 ď Λ ď 1), which significantly
increases the connection failure ratio, thereby resulting in
a high probability of unsuccessful data delivery. Hence, a
network can be sustainable in terms of successful data de-
livery only if the number of active links is large enough to
take advantage of path diversity. Note that Algorithm 1 is
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scalable to the network size in terms of the connection fail-
ure ratio (or network topology formation) since the impact
of network size on the connection failure ratios is limited,
as shown in Figure 6. Therefore, the proposed algorithm
can be deployed in large-scale networks.
In Figure 7, the network utilities for various network
sizes and unit costs are shown. The network utility in-
creases asNV increases (i.e., more rewards can be achieved)
or Λ decreases (i.e., the cost for link formation is lowered).
In the experiments, for example, network nodes decide not
to build any links if Λ “ 1, achieving no network utility.
We next evaluate the performance of the proposed al-
gorithm in terms of the network goodput, measured by
the number of packets successfully delivered to the desti-
nations per time slot. The results are shown in Figure 8
and Figure 9. In this experiment, the connection boundary
is set as ∆ “ 1.1R, and all nodes in the network generate
and deliver packets toward two destination nodes. They
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Figure 8: Network goodput with and without network coding for
unit costs in various network sizes.
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Figure 9: Network goodput with and without network coding over
network sizes when Λ “ 0.1.
make decisions on link formation based on Algorithm 1. It
is obvious that network goodput decreases as unit cost in-
creases because the connection failure ratio also increases,
as confirmed in Figure 6. Figure 8 shows that higher net-
work goodput can be achieved by deploying network cod-
ing, which means that the proposed algorithm successfully
builds the network while taking advantage of network cod-
ing. In Figure 8 and Figure 9, it is observed that network
goodput decreases as network size increases. This is be-
cause the number of hops required for a packet to arrive at
the destination increases as the network size is enlarged,
taking a longer time for packet delivery. The results are
well-aligned with [68], which theoretically proves that the
goodput scales as Op1{?NV logNV q in random networks
and Op1{?NV q in the optimal networks.
In the next section, we compare the network perfor-
mances achieved by topology formation strategies includ-
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Figure 10: Network utility for four strategies.
ing the proposed algorithm.
5.3. Performance Comparison
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the pro-
posed algorithm in terms of network utility and computa-
tional complexity. The performance of the proposed al-
gorithm is compared with the existing network formation
strategies shown below.
1. Non-NC Centralized : A centralized solution to find
an optimal network topology based on exhaustive
search. The network does not deploy network cod-
ing such that the solution should be found by explic-
itly considering the inter-link dependency condition.
This strategy can be formulated as
pai˚ , a˚´ iq “ arg maxpai,a´iqUpai, a´i,Dq
subject to
ÿ
@vjPHi
Eijpaiq ď 1,@vi P VpGq.
2. NC Centralized : A centralized solution to find an op-
timal network topology based on exhaustive search.
The network deploys network coding such that the
inter-link dependency condition cannot be consid-
ered. It can be formulated as
pai˚ , a˚´ iq “ arg maxpai,a´iqUpai, a´i,Dq.
3. TCLE [11]: A distributed solution to topology for-
mation based on a non-cooperative game. For fair
comparison, we deploy network coding, and no inter-
link dependency condition is considered. In this strat-
egy, a node chooses its transmission power by bal-
ancing the target network connectivity redundancy
 against transmission energy dissipation. The num-
ber of actions available for a node is denoted by η.
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Figure 10 shows the network utility from each network
formation strategy, including the proposed algorithm. The
NC-Centralized strategy can achieve the highest network
utility because the optimal network topology can be cho-
sen from all possible topologies that can be formed from
other strategies. Hence, this can be considered as the
upper bound of network coding based strategies. The
proposed strategy provides higher network utility than
the Non-NC Centralized strategy and TCLE. Unlike the
proposed approach, which can consider more topologies
to maximize rewards by making multiple outgoing links,
the Non-NC Centralized strategy can find the optimal
topology that is allowed only by the inter-link dependency
condition. Among the considered strategies, TCLE pro-
vides the lowest network utility because the focus of TCLE
is not on construction of successful connections between
source nodes and destination nodes when it forms a net-
work topology. Instead, it considers overall network con-
nectivity in terms of algebraic connectivity [69].
We next investigate the complexity required to deploy
the network formation strategies, which is measured by the
size of the search space. The search space is determined by
the number of actions available for link formation. The size
of the network considered in the complexity analysis is n.
For the Non-NC Centralized strategy, each node can make
at most one outgoing link, so that a node has at most n link
formation choices. Given n nodes in the network, the max-
imum number of choices is thus nn, and the complexity is
Opnnq. For the NC Centralized strategy, each node has a
maximum 2n´1 choices because each node has a maximum
of n´ 1 neighbor nodes to make a link, and each link can
be either active or inactive. Given n nodes in the network,
the maximum number of choices is thus 2npn´1q and the
complexity becomes Op2n2q. The proposed algorithm has
a maximum of
`
n
2
˘
neighbor node pairs, and each pair has
four actions. Because each node pair chooses an action in-
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Table 4: Theoretical complexity with network size n
Strategy Non-NC Centralized NC Centralized TCLE [11] Proposed
Complexity (Worst Case) Opnnq Op2n2q Opη ¨ n3q Opn2q
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Figure 12: Complexity required for the four strategies (worst case
scenarios).
dependently, the search space becomes
`
n
2
˘ˆ4, so that the
complexity becomes Opn2q. The complexity in TCLE is
Opη ¨ n3q, because there are n nodes and each one has the
worst case complexity Opη ¨ n2q. Therefore, the proposed
strategy requires the lowest complexity to find the optimal
network topology, so that it can be deployed in practice
into a large-scale network. The complexity required for the
four network formation strategies is summarized in Table 4
and presented in Figure 11 and Figure 12. In Figure 12,
it is clearly observed that the complexity for centralized
strategies grows much faster than decentralized strategies
as the network grows. Thus, it is not feasible to use such
high complexity centralized strategies in a realistic large
network setting.
We further show the performance comparison in terms
of average per-node goodput (packets/time slot/node) for
decentralized solutions (i.e., proposed and TCLE) over in-
creasing network sizes up to 50 nodes. The location of
node is randomly generated with uniform distribution and
this is the average results from 4000 independent simu-
lations. The average per-node goodput is defined as the
average number of successfully delivered packets per time
per node [70, 71, 72, 73] such that it is a fair measure to
compare goodput of the network with different sizes. The
per-node goodput can be different upon utilization of net-
work coding. In Figure 13, we show both cases for a given
network - with and without network coding. Figure 13
shows that the proposed solution outperforms TCLE in
all range of network sizes and both NC and Non-NC cases.
As the network size grows, it is observed that the per-node
goodput decreases across the strategies. This is because as
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the network size increases, it requires a longer travel time
to arrive at the destination, leading to a lower per-node
goodput. If each node can send maximum a packet per
time slot, which is the assumption of this simulation, the
upper bound of per-node goodput in an optimal network
without network coding becomes 1 per-node goodput, i.e.,
all nodes send 1 packet per time slot (fully utilizing the
link capacity) and all transmitted packets are successfully
delivered to destination (no connection failure, no packet
loss).
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose an algorithm for a distributed
topology formation in network coding enabled large-scale
sensor networks with multi-source multicast flows. The
distributed topology formation problem is formulated as
a network formation game in which the players (nodes in
the network) decide whether to make links with neighbor
nodes by considering a reward for distance reduction and
the cost required for link formation. We show that the
network formation game can be decomposed into indepen-
dent link formation games by deploying network coding.
Network topologies can thus be determined based on the
solution to individual link formation games played by only
two nodes, leading to a distributed algorithm with low
complexity. We also show that the proposed algorithm
guarantees to find at least one network topology. The sim-
ulation results confirm that the proposed algorithm can
achieve high network utility with significantly low com-
plexity and is scalable to any network size. Therefore, it
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can be deployed in large-size networks.
Appendix A. Network Coding Based Dissemina-
tion
In the network operation in (4), node vj combines its
data xj and all the incoming data Xij ,@vi P H˜inj multi-
plied by local coding coefficients cij ,@vi P tH˜inj , vju, ex-
pressed as
yj “
ÿ
viPH˜inj
à pcij bXijq ‘ cjj b xj
“
ÿ
viPH˜inj
à pcij b yiq ‘ cjj b xj (A.1)
“
ÿ
viPH˜inj
à˜
cij b
˜
NVÿ
k“1
à pCki b xkq¸¸‘ cjj b xj .
(A.2)
In (A.1), Xij “ yi because pi “ rC1i, . . . , CNV i, yis is
transmitted through eij , and (A.2) is induced from (4).
Since the global coding coefficient Ckj is updated in
every encoding process, (A.2) can be expressed as
yj “
ÿ
viPH˜inj
à˜NVÿ
k“1
à
cij b Cki b xk
¸
‘ cjj b xj
“
NVÿ
k“1
à¨˝ ÿ
viPtH˜inj ,vju
à
cij b Cki‚˛b xk (A.3)
“
NVÿ
k“1
à pCkj b xkq . (A.4)
In (A.4), the global coding coefficient is updated based on
Cki “ řviPtH˜inj ,vjuÀ cijbCki. Thus, pj “ rC1j , . . . , CNV j , yjs
is constructed and forwarded to the nodes in H˜outj .
In this paper, we assume that all data in a network
are elements in a GF with size 2M , denoted as GF(2M q,
i.e., xi, yi P GF(2M q, as the network coding operations
in (4) are performed in a GF. Moreover, we use random
linear network coding (RLNC) [74] so that the local coding
coefficient is randomly selected in GF(2M q.
Let Si “ tvj |vi P Dj ,@vj P VpGqu be a set of source
nodes whose destination set includes vi and Si “ tj|vj P
Siu be an index set of source nodes for vi. Given the
packets p˜1, . . . , p˜K that vi received, we can construct a
vector of network coded data y˜ “ ry˜1, . . . , y˜KsT and the
global coding coefficient matrix C˜, expressed as
C˜ “
»—– C˜11 ¨ ¨ ¨ C˜NV 1...
C˜1K ¨ ¨ ¨ C˜NVK
fiffifl “ rc˜1 ¨ ¨ ¨ c˜NV s (A.5)
where c˜j “ rC˜j1, . . . , C˜jKsT .
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3 can be proved by showing that at least one
pure strategy NE exists for the link formation game, i.e.
A˚ ‰ H.
Nash’s Existence Theorem [75] shows that every finite
game has a mixed strategy NE, where pure strategies are
chosen stochastically with certain probabilities. Since the
link formation game GLpdq defined in (23) includes a finite
number of nodes and a finite number of actions, it is a
finite game. Therefore, a mixed strategy NE exists for
this game.
Suppose that αi is a strategy of player vi with the
probability of taking action ai “ 1. The corresponding
utility is given by
uipαi, αj , dq “ αi
ˆ
fpδjdq ´ f pδidq ´
ˆ
1
1` Ejipαjq ¨ Λ
˙˙
.
Let αi˚ and αj˚ be mixed strategy NEs for vi and vj that
satisfy uipαi˚ , αj˚ , dq ě uipαi, αj˚ , dq and ujpαi˚ , αj˚ , dq ě
ujpαi˚ , αj , dq for all vi, vj P VpLq.
For the ξ P r´αi˚ , 1´ αi˚ s perturbation of mixed strat-
egy NE αi˚ , the resulting utility of vi can be expressed
as
uipαi˚ ` ξ, αj , dq
“ pαi˚ ` ξq ˆ
ˆ
fpδjdq ´ f pδidq ´
ˆ
1
1` Ejipαjq ¨ Λ
˙˙
“ uipαi˚ , αj , dq ` ξ ˆ
ˆ
fpδjdq ´ f pδidq ´
ˆ
1
1` Ejipαjq ¨ Λ
˙˙
“ uipαi˚ , αj , dq ` ξ ˆ β.
If β ą 0, then Buipα˚i `ξ,αj ,dqBξ ą 0, and thus, vi can always
decrease its utility by decreasing ξ. This means that the
pure strategy αi “ 0 strictly dominates any strategies αi˚ `
ξ. For β ă 0, on the other hand, Buipα˚i `ξ,αj ,dqBξ ă 0,
and thus, the pure strategy αi “ 1 strictly dominates any
strategies αi˚ ` ξ. If β “ 0, then Buipα
˚
i `ξ,αj ,dqBξ “ 0 and ξ
does not affect the cost such that both pure strategies αi “
0 and αi “ 1 have the same utility as the mixed strategy
NE αi˚ . Therefore, the pure strategy αi “ 0 or αi “ 1 can
always weakly dominate mixed strategies αi˚ ` ξ.
Similarly, the ξ perturbation of mixed strategy NE αj˚
also concludes that the pure strategy αj “ 0 or αj “ 1 can
always weakly dominate mixed strategies αj˚ ` ξ.
In conclusion, a pure strategy NE can always weakly
dominate mixed strategy NEs in the link formation game
GLpdq, implying that a pure strategy NE exists. Hence,
Algorithm 1 guarantees at least one topology.
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